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CASE COMMENTS
UNIFIED JURISDICTIONAL TEST APPLIED TO IN PERSONAM
JURISDICTION
Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978)
In Kulko v. Superior Court,' the Supreme Court clarified the applica-
tion of the unified jurisdictional standard2 to assertions of in personam
jurisdiction.
The Kulkos, while domiciled in New York, were married in Califor-
nia in 1959 during Mr. Kulko's brief stopover en route to overseas mili-
tary duty.3 Mrs. Kulko immediately returned to New York and Mr.
Kulko joined her there upon completing his overseas service. In 1972
Mrs. Kulko moved to California while Mr. Kulko and their two chil-
dren remained in New York. Shortly thereafter, she returned to New
York to execute a separation agreement, which provided that the chil-
dren would remain in their father's custody during the school year but
would spend vacation periods with her. The agreement, which also
provided for Mr. Kulko's payment of child support, was incorporated
into the terms of a Haitian divorce decree Mrs. Kulko subsequently
obtained.4
In 1973 when their daughter expressed her desire to reverse the cus-
tody schedule-to live with her mother during the school year and with
her father during vacation periods-Mr. Kulko acquiesced and
purchased a one-way plane ticket to California for her.5 In 1976 the
former Mrs. Kulko, at her son's request and without Mr. Kulko's
knowledge, sent her son a one-way plane ticket, which he used to join
his sister and mother in California.6 She then brought an action in
California to establish the Haitian divorce decree as a California judg-
ment and to modify it to grant her custody of the children and an in-
crease in child support payments.7
Appearing specially to contest the California court's assertion of per-
sonal jurisdiction, Kulko moved to quash service, arguing that he lack-
1. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
2. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
3. 436 U.S. at 86.
4. Id. at 86-87.
5. Id. at 87.
6. Id. at 88.
7. Id. at 86-88.
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ed sufficient "minimum contacts" with California to be required to
defend a child support and custody suit there.8 Upon summary denial
of his motion,9 Kulko petitioned the California Court of Appeal for a
writ of mandate."0 The appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial,
as did the California Supreme Court.II Treating the appeal as a peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari,' 2 the United States Supreme Court reversed
and held: A nonresident's acquiescence in his child's desire to live with
her mother in the forum and his purchase of a one-way plane ticket for
that purpose is not sufficient contact to justify the assertion of in per-
sonam jurisdiction in a claim for increased child support. 13
The fourteenth amendment guarantees that no person shall be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.' 4 The
seminal decision in Pennoyer v. Neff'5 introduced the notion of due
process into modern jurisdictional law. Bringing an ejectment action in
federal court in Oregon, Neff collaterally attacked an Oregon state
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. 63 Cal. App. 3d 417, 133 Cal. Rptr. 627 (1976).
11. 19 Cal. 3d 514, 564 P.2d 353, 138 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1977).
12. 436 U.S. at 90 n.4.
13. Id. at 93, 95-96.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, provides in pertinent part: "No state shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." The opera-
tive phrase, "due process of law," comes from chapter 3 of the Statute of 28 Edward III (1355),
which provided: "No man of what state or condition that he be, shall be put out of land or
tenement, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to death, without he be brought in
answer by due process of the law." See E. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 90-91
(1948). Historically, due process of law was an "authoritative term for the established ways of
justice." Hamilton, The Path of Due Process ofLaw, in AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 132 (L.
Levy ed. 1966). See also Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 486 (1813) (Johnson, J.,
dissenting).
One of the most established of judicial procedures inherited from the common law was the
theory that a sovereign state may exercise jurisdiction only over persons or property within its
territory. A corollary is that if a sovereign state asserted extraterritorial jurisdiction over persons
or property, that act was contrary to the established ways of justice and therefore void. E.
CORWIN, THE CoNsTrIrUTION 262 (1954). Under the United States Constitution, any judgment so
procured is not entitled to full faith and credit. U.S. CONST. art. IV provides: "Full faith and
credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every
other State." See, e.g., D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165 (1851); Developments in the
Law-State-Court Jurfidiction, 73 HArv. L. REv. 909, 915 (1960). See generally J. STORY, COM-
MENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 754 (8th ed. 1883). Consequently, the common law recog-
nized two bases for asserting jurisdiction over nonresident defendants: presence within the
territory and actual consent to be bound by the judgment of the court. Developments in the Law,
supra, at 916-17.
15. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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court default judgment entered against him.1 6 'On appeal, the Supreme
Court declared the state court judgment void because procured without
jurisdiction over either Neffs person or property 17 and restated the ter-
ritorial bases for in personam and in rem jurisdiction.'" Pennoyer's
pervasive influence on the development of personal jurisdiction law is
attributable to Justice Field's defining of "full faith and credit' 9 in
terms of due process;2" that is, a judgment is entitled to full faith and
credit only if the jurisdictional requirements of due process have first
been satisfied.2" On the one hand, full faith and credit is fundamentally
a power concept.22 Based on territoriality, it is designed to permit soy-
16. Id. at 715-16.
17. The state court action had been brought by one Mitchell for less than $300, which Neff
allegedly owed him for legal services. The state court asserted in personam jurisdiction over Neff
pursuant to an Oregon statute that provided for service of process by publication in suits against
nonresidents who owned property within the state. Mitchell did not seek attachment of the prop-
erty prior to his suit, relying instead on the Oregon statute's provision for in personam jurisdiction.
Upon Neffs default, plaintiff executed his judgment against Neff's land, which was then sold to
Pennoyer at a sheriffs sale. .d. at 719-20.
The Supreme Court held that the state court never acquired in personam jurisdiction because
there was no personal service of process within the state. "Process sent to [a person] out of the
State, and process published within it, are equally unavailing in proceedings to establish his per-
sonal liability." Id. at 727. Because Neff's land was not attached prior to the default judgment,
the Oregon court did not have in rem jurisdiction, and the Court concluded that "[ijf the judgment
be previously void, it will not become valid by the subsequent discovery of property of the defend-
ant, or by his subsequent acquisition of it." Id. at 728.
18. The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent,
many of the rights and powers which originally belonged to them being now vested in
the government created by the Constitution. But, except as restrained and limited by
that instrument, they possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and the
principles of public law to which we have referred are applicable to them. One of these
principles is, that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over per-
sons and property within its territory .... The other principle of public law referred to
follows from the one mentioned, that is, that no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and
authority over persons or property without its territory.
Id. at 722. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
19. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1. See note 14 supra.
20. 95 U.S. at 729-33.
Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, the
validity of such judgments may be directly questioned, and their enforcement in the
State resisted, on the ground that proceedings in a court of justice to determine the per-
sonal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not
constitute due process of law.
Id. at 733.
21. See Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdic-
tion of State Courts-From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. Ci. L. REv. 568, 572 (1958);
Developments in the Law, supra note 14, at 917.
22. See THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (J. Madison); NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CON-
VENTION OF 1787, 546-47 (J. Madison rptr. 1966).
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ereigns to coexist within a federal system.23 On the other hand, due
process, when reduced to its lowest common denominator, connotes
fairness.24 Phrasing the power concept in terms implying fairness, the
emergent rule obscured the underlying tension. The result was a di-
chotomy of interpretation as courts strove to apply both the letter and
the spirit of Pennoyer to an increasingly complex socio-economic
milieu.
25
Multistate corporations26 and a newly mobile public27 forced the
courts to modify the rigid jurisdictional rules inherited from Pennoyer.
Notions of fictional or implied consent2" facilitated local litigation and
thereby guaranteed that the nonresident motorist or the foreign corpo-
ration would be accountable for its activities in the forum state2 9 First,
courts recognized that it was unfair and inconvenient, if not cost pro-
23. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197 (1977). See generally E. CORWIN, THE CONSTI-
TUTION, supra note 14, at 157-59.
24. See 436 U.S. at 91; Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463-64 (1940). See also E. CORWIN,
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 14, at 247.
25. See notes 26-33 infra and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., Philadelphia & R. Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1916); Bank of Augusta v.
Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839). See generally Kurland, supra note 21.
27. See Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); Kane v.
New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916); Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1915). See generally A.
Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction.- The 'Power" Myth and Forum
Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J 289 (1956).
28. See, e.g., Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253, 258 (1933) (owner's permitting another to use his
automobile and drive into another state manifests his consent to suit in the other state's courts for
highway torts committed by the driver); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927) (use of state
highways implies consent to suit in state for causes of action arising from use of the highways); St.
Louis S.W. Ry. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218, 227 (1913) (extent and character of the corporation's
activity determines whether it has impliedly consented to the jurisdiction and laws of the forum);
Commercial Mut. Accident Co. v. Davis, 213 U.S. 245, 254 (1909) (presumption that corporate
agent sent into state represents the corporation for the purpose of service of process); Barrow S.S.
Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 108 (1898) (amenability of foreign corporation to suit is implicit in
statutes granting it permission to do business in the territory); St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 356
(1882) (foreign corporations cannot do business in another state without the latter's consent, which
may be accompanied by any reasonable conditions); Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal &
Iron Co., 222 F. 148, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (implied consent is a "mere creature ofjustice" and is,
therefore, as broadly inclusive as justice requires). Compare Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289, 293
(1919) (states cannot exclude nonresidents; therefore nonresidents cannot be presumed to have
impliedly consented to the jurisdiction of the forum state), with Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294
U.S. 623, 627-28 (1935) (state may exclude nonresident individuals from engaging in certain regul-
able businesses, and engaging in those businesses is deemed consent to suit in the jurisdiction).
But see International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91, 110 (1910) (state may not exclude corpo-
rations engaged in interstate commerce).
29. See Washington v. Superior Court, 289 U.S. 361, 364-65 (1933) (consent extends to ac-
tions brought after the corporation has withdrawn from the forum state); note 28 supra. See also
Kurland, supra note 21, at 576-77.
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hibitive, to compel the plaintiff to litigate in a distant forum simply
because the defendant was incorporated or resided there. ° Second,
courts recognized that the states, by enacting particularized jurisdic-
tional statutes, had expressed interest in providing a forum for subjects
of special responsibility." In addition to implied consent, various tests
gained limited currency.32 All were reducible, however, to the basic
question whether the defendant's activities were of a kind and quantity
sufficient to make it reasonable to require defense of suit in the
forum.3 3
International Shoe Co. v. Washington34 signaled a shift from the rigid
doctrinal rules engendered by Pennoyer to a pragmatic approach. Syn-
thesizing preceding jurisdictional law, the Court held that due process
permits a state to assert in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant, provided he has "minimum contacts" with the forum, and
"maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice. '35 As courts struggled to apply this ambiguous
30. See Byham v. National Cibo House Corp., 265 N.C. 50, 60, 143 S.E.2d 225, 234 (1965).
See generall' Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927); Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45
F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930). See also von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A
SuggestedAnalyis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121, 1167 (1966); Developments in the Law, supra note 14,
at 920.
31. See, e.g., Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935) (securities regulation); Young
v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933) (nonresident owner of motor vehicle); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S.
352 (1927) (nonresident motorist); Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916) (same); Commercial
Mut. Accident Co. v. Davis, 213 U.S. 245 (1909) (foreign insurance companies); Smolik v. Phila-
delphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 F. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (corporations doing business in
state must be licensed).
32. See, e.g., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940) (domicile); Philadelphia & R. Ry. v.
McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917) (doing business); Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining
Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1916) (same); International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914)
(fictive corporate presence); St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1913) (doing business);
Frene v. Louisville Cement Co., 134 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1943) (solicitation); Tauza v. Susque-
hanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917) (same). See generally Kurland, supra note 21,
at 577-86.
33. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (single contact with forum state
by mail is sufficient); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) ("It]he amount
and kind of activities which must be carried on by the foreign corporation in the state of the forum
so as to make it reasonable and just to subject the corporation to the jurisdiction of that state are to
be determined in each case"); Reynolds v. Missouri K. & T.R. Co., 224 Mass. 379, 113 N.E. 413
(1916) ("while many of these elements alone might be held not to be doing business, we think that,
grouped in combination, they constitute a doing of business within the commonwealth sufficient to
subject it to the service of process"). See generally Developments in the Law, supra note 14, at 923.
34. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
35. Id. at 316.
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standard, what emerged was an all-inclusive balancing test.36 On the
facts of each case, courts assessed such factors as the nature and quality
of the contacts with the forum state,37 the quantity of contacts with the
forum state,38 the relation of the cause of action to the forum state,39
whether the test should be applied uniformly where the parties were of
disparate resources,' ° the need of the forum state to protect specific in-
terests,41 the foreseeability that the action sued upon would accrue in
36. See Kilpatrick v. Texas & P. Ry., 166 F.2d 788, 790-91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S.
814 (1948). See generally Developments in the Law, supra note 14, at 924.
37. See, e-g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1957) ("[i]t is essential in each case that there
be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activi-
ties within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws"); Travelers
Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950) (mail-order contacts sufficient); Product Promo-
tions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974) (physical act in forum is unnecessary, deliber-
ate contacts suffice); Latimer v. S/A Industrias Reunidas F. Matarazzo, 175 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.)
(local activities must be continuous), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 867 (1949); Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F.
Supp. 42 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (service of process while flying over state sufficient); Storey v. United
Ins. Co., 64 F. Supp. 896 (E.D.S.C. 1946) (mail-order contacts sufficient); Unicorn Invs. v. Fisco,
Inc., 137 N.J. Super. 395, 349 A.2d 117 (1975) (physical act or business transaction in the forum
unnecessary). See generaly RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 27 (1971); 2
MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 4.25-1 & 4.41-1, at 230-32, 405-508 (2d ed. 1978).
38. See, eg., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (single contact
sufficient); Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 1956)
(single shipment into state insufficient). See generally von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 30, at
1172 (jurisdiction may be proper when there are no contacts).
39. See, eg., Perkins v. Benguet ConsoL Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446 (1952) (Constitution
does not prohibit state from exercising in personam jurisdiction over cause of action not arising
out of corporation's activities in forum state); Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d
222, 225, 347 P.2d 1, 3, 1 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (1959) (courts can exercise jurisdiction to enforce causes of
action not arising out of the corporation's activities in the state but more contacts are required).
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 37 (1971); Hazard, A General
Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. Rav. 241; Developments in the Law, supra note
14, at 928-32.
40. See, eg., Empire Abrasive Equip. Corp. v. H.H. Watson, Inc., 567 F.2d 554 (3d Cir.
1977) ('a]bsent disparity in bargaining power, in a dispute growing out of a commercial contrac-
tual undertaking, that issue [the unfairness of compelling a foreign corporation to defend in the
forum state] can be best decided, we think, by reference to the expectations of the parties to the
transactions"); Fourth N.W. Nat'l Bank v. Hilson Indus., Inc., 264 Minn. 110, 117 N.W.2d 732
(1962) (distinction between suing a resident seller and invoking a long-arm statute against a non-
resident buyer); J.W. Sparks & Co. v. Gallos, 47 N.J. 295, 220 A.2d 673 (1966) (no distinction
between nonresident individuals and foreign corporations); Conn v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250,
342 P.2d 871 (1959) (consumer's response to mail-order solicitation from foreign corporation does
not constitute consent to suit in the state of incorporation). See generaly R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN
CoNFLICTS LAW § 32 (3d ed. 1977); von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 30, at 1127, 1167, 1172
(in "domestic situations a general and almost universally accepted maxim favors the attacked over
the complainant at least when the parties enjoy relatively equal economic strength and social
standing"); Developments in the Law, supra note 14, at 929, 935-37; Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 1201, 1216
(1968).
41. See, ,g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 214-15 (1977) ("[i]f Delaware perceived its
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the forum state,42 the interest of the forum state in providing a forum
for resident plaintiffs, 43 the expectation of the parties,44 the convenience
of the parties,45 fairness and basic equities,46 and whether there were
interest in securing jurisdiction over corporate fiduciaries to be as great as Heitner suggests, we
would expect it to have enacted a statute more clearly designed to protect that interest"); Travelers
Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950) (statute asserting jurisdiction over foreign insurance
companies); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Schmitt, 441 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (state interest in
consumer fraud protected by asserting jurisdiction through licensing of certain foreign businesses);
Ace Grain Co. v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 95 F. Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (insurance);
Storey v. United Ins. Co., 64 F. Supp. 896 (E.D.S.C. 1946) (mail-order insurance); Zacharakis v.
Bunker Hill Mut. Ins. Co., 281 App. Div. 487, 120 N.Y.S. 2d 418 (1953) (insurance); note 31 supra
and accompanying text. See generally Brief for Appellant at 25-26, Kulko v. Superior Court, 436
U.S. 84 (1978) (interest in discouraging forum shopping).
42. See Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 496 (5th Cir. 1974) ("activities
outside the State can provide adequate contacts if they have reasonably foreseeable consequences
within the State"); Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 902, 458 P.2d 57, 64, 80
Cal. Rptr. 113, 120 (1969) ("[i]f the manufacturer sells its products in circumstances such that it
knows or should reasonably anticipate that they will ultimately be resold in a particular state, it
should be held to have purposefully availed itself of the market for its products in that state");
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 I11. 2d 432, 442, 176 N.E.2d 761, 766
(196 1) ("it is not unreasonable, where a cause of action arises from alleged defects in his product,
to say that the use of such products in the ordinary course of commerce is sufficient contact with
this State to justify a requirement that he defend here"); DeCook v. Environmental Sec. Corp.,
258 N.W.2d 721 (Iowa 1977) (conspiracy of nonresidents to deplete the assets of an Iowa corpora-
tion has reasonably foreseeable consequences in the state); Unicorn Invs. v. Fisco, Inc., 137 N.J.
Super. 395, 349 A.2d 117 (1975) (out-of-state agreement with reasonably foreseeable consequences
in-state). See generally Note, Shaffer v. Heitner-Reshaping the Contours of State Court
Jurisdiction, 11 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 87 (1977).
43. See, e.g., Ashe v. Pepsico, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (witness convenience);
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Schmitt, 441 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (presence of important
records and witnesses); Ace Grain Co. v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 95 F. Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y.
1951) (state forum necessary since resort to distant forum would pose an "insuperable obstacle");
Storey v. United Ins. Co., 64 F. Supp. 896 (E.D.S.C. 1946) (without local forum those with small
claims or those who would have to travel long distances would not litigate); Nelson v. Miller, 11
ll. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957) (substantial contacts provide a legitimate interest for the state to
exercise jurisdiction); Byham v. National Cibo House Corp., 265 N.C. 50, 143 S.E.2d 225 (1965)
(witnesses, evidence, and small claims make actions in defendant's forum prohibitively
expensive).
44. See, e.g., Empire Abrasive Equip. Corp. v. H.H. Watson, Inc., 567 F.2d 554 (3d Cir.
1977) (commercial contract can specify where enforceable); Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre
Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956) (commercial contract may designate state where jurisdic-
tion will lie).
45. See, e.g., Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974); Latimer v.
S/A Industrias Reunidas F. Matarazzo, 175 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 867 (1949);
Kilpatrick v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 166 F.2d 788 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 814 (1947); Ashe v.
Pepsico, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Schmitt, 441 F. Supp. 440
(N.D. Cal. 1977); Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 222, 347 P.2d 1, 1 Cal. Rptr.
1 (1959); Moon Carrier v. Reliance Ins. Co., 153 N.J. Super. 312, 379 A.2d 517 (1977); Smyth v.
Twin States Improvement Co., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951); Brief for Appellant at 24-26,
Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978). See generally R. LEFLAR, supra note 40, at 68-71;
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alternate fora available.47
Since International Shoe, the Court has acted at least twice to delimit
the due process boundaries of its minimum contacts test. In Hanson v.
Denckla,48 the Court held the exercise of jurisdiction improper even
where the forum had a strong interest in protecting the rights of resi-
dent plaintiffs because defendant had not "purposefully availed" itself
of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum.49 Shaffer v.
Heitner5° marked a substantial departure from Pennoyer by bringing
the exercise of quasi in rem and in rem jurisdiction within the strictures
of International Shoe.5 The Shaffer Court also shifted the focus of the
International Shoe fair play-substantial justice test from a requirement
of minimum contacts to a requirement of a nexus among the forum, the
litigation, and the defendant.5
In Kulko v. Superior Court,53 the Supreme Court indicated that the
absence of a strong forum-defendant nexus precludes the exercise of in
personam jurisdiction even where the forum-plaintiff and forum-litiga-
Blair, The Doctrine ofForum Non Com'eniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1
(1929); Ehrenzweig, supra note 27, at 312; Kurland, supra note 21, at 574; Morely, Forum Non
Conveniens: Restraining Long-Arm Jurisdiction, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 24 (1973); von Mehren &
Trautman, supra note 30, at 1167, 1172.
46. See, eg., Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 444-45 (1952); Product
Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 498 (5th Cir. 1974). See generally Block Indus. v.
DHJ Indus., Inc., 495 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1974); Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316
P.2d 960 (1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); Zammit, Quasi-in-Rem Jurisdiction: Outmoded
and Unconstitutional?, 49 ST. JOHNS L. REv. 668, 677 (1975).
47. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Empire
Abrasive Equip. Corp. v. H.H. Watson, Inc., 567 F.2d 554 (3d Cir. 1977); Carr v. Carr, 60 App.
Div. 2d 63, 400 N.Y.S.2d 105 (1977).
48. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
49. "[I]t is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the
benefit and protection of its laws." Id. at 253. See Kurland, supra note 21, at 621; Scott, Hanson
v. Denckla, 72 HARv. L. REv. 695, 702 (1959); Developments in the Law, supra note 14, at 964.
50. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). See generally Casad, Shaffer v. Heitner. An End to Ambivalence in
Jurisdiction Theory?, 26 U. KAN. L. R'v. 61 (1977); Fischer, 'Minimum Contacts'" Shaffer's Uni-
fied Jurisdictional Test, 12 VA.. U.L. Rav. 25 (1977); Friedenthal, A Comment on the Impact of
Shaffer v. Heitner in the Classroom, 1978 WAsH. U.L.Q. 319; Olsen, Shaffer v. Heitner: A Survey
of Its Effects on Washington Jurisdiction, 13 GoNZ. L. REv. 72 (1977); Sedler, Judicial Jurisdiction
and Choice ofLaw in Interstate Accident Cases: The Implications of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978
WASH. U.L.Q. 329; Vernon, Single-Factor Bases ofIn Personam Jurisdiction-A Speculation on the
Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 273; Note, Shaffer v. Heitner: Reshaping the
Contours ofState Jurisdiction, 11 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 87 (1977); 13 TULSA L.J. 82 (1977).
51. "[A]I assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards
set forth in International Shoe and its progeny." 433 U.S. at 212.
52. Id. at 204. See also Vernon, supra note 50, at 298.
53. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
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tion nexuses are strong.54 Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, re-
jected the California court's rationale that by "actively and fully
consenting"55 to his daughter's living in California with her mother,
Kulko had committed a "purposeful act"56 warranting California's ex-
ercise of in personam jurisdiction over him." A purposeful act suffi-
cient to provide the requisite forum-defendant nexus required more
than Kulko's permitting his child to remain with the mother beyond
the time specified in the separation agreement. 8 Further, Kulko had
not, as the California Supreme Court asserted, 9 derived financial ben-
efit from his acquiescence in his child's desire to live in California.60
The Court observed that "[a]ny diminution in appellant's household
costs resulted, not from the child's presence in California, but rather
from her absence from appellant's home."6 The Court reaffirmed that
the threshold test for determining the existence of a constitutionally
sufficient forum-defendant nexus is that the defendant must have "pur-
posefully availed]" himself of the privilege of conducting activities in
the forum state.62 "But the mere act of sending a child to California to
live with her mother is not a commercial act and connotes no intent to
obtain nor expectancy of receiving a corresponding benefit in the State
that would make fair the assertion of that State's jurisdiction."63
The majority then rejected the argument that jurisdiction should lie
because Kulko had caused an effect in the forum. 4 California's asser-
54. Id. at 98. See Vernon, supra note 50, at 317.
55. 19 Cal. 3d 514, 524, 564 P.2d 353, 358, 138 Cal. Rptr. 586, 591 (1977).
56. Id.
57. 436 U.S. at 94.
58. Id.
59. 19 Cal. 3d at 524-25, 564 P.2d at 358, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
60. 436 U.S. at 94.
61. Id. at 95.
62. Id. at 94 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1957)).
63. Id. at 101.
64. The Court found that the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 (1971)
was inapplicable. "[Tihis section was intended to reach wrongful activity outside of the State
causing injury within the State ... or commercial activity affecting state residents ... ' 436
U.S. at 96. Section 37 provides:
A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who causes effects
in the state by an act done elsewhere with respect to any cause of action arising from
these effects unless the nature of the effects and of the individual's relationship to the
state make the exercise of such jurisdiction unreasonable.
California's jurisdictional statute allows California courts to exercise personal jurisdiction on
any basis not inconsistent with either the state or federal constitutions. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 410.10 (Deering 1972). The Judicial Council Comment accompanying § 410.10 indicates that
the "cause and effect" test is subsumed under the general approach of the California statute.
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tion of jurisdiction on this basis was unreasonable because there was
"no claim that appellant [had] visited physical injury on either property
or persons within the State of California.
65
Noting that New York was the reasonable forum,66 the Court em-
phasized that California's participation in the Uniform Reciprocal En-
forcement of Support Act of 1968 (URESA) 67 protected its interest "in
ensuring the support of children resident in California. 68
Kulko's significance lies in its refusal to extend state jurisdictional
power beyond the parameters established by Hanson and Shaffer.69
65. 436 U.S. at 96-97.
66. Id. at 97-98.
Finally, basic considerations of fairness point decisively in favor of appellant's State of
domicile as the proper forum for adjudication of this case, whatever the merits of appel-
lee's underlying claim. It is appellant who has remained in the State of the marital domi-
cile, whereas it is appellee who has moved across the continent. Appellant has at all
times resided in New York State, and, until the separation and appellee's move to Cali-
fornia, his entire family resided there as well. As noted above, appellant did no more
than acquiesce in the stated preference of one of his children to live with her mother in
California. This single act is surely not one that a reasonable parent would expect to
result in the substantial financial burden and personal strain of litigating a child-support
suit in a forum 3,000 miles away, and we therefore see no basis on which it can be said
that appellant could reasonably have anticipated being "haled before a [California]
court." To make jurisdiction in a case such as this turn on whether appellant bought his
daughter her ticket or instead unsuccessfully sought to prevent her departure would im-
pose an unreasonable burden on family relations, and one wholly unjustified by the
"quality and nature" of appellant's activities in or relating to the State of California.
Id. (citations and footnote omitted) (brackets in original).
67. Id. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1650-1697 (Deering 1972). URESA allows an obligee
of a support duty to file a complaint to enforce that duty in the courts of his home state, Le., the
"initiating state." Id. § 1673. After the initiating state court certifies the complaint, it transmits
copies to the state court where the obligor resides, Le., the "responding state." Id. § 1676. The
prosecuting attorney in the responding state then locates the obligor, serves him with process, and
prosecutes the case. Id. §§ 1680-1681. If the court in the responding state determines that there is
a duty of support, it issues an order to furnish support or reimbursement. The court and prosecut-
ing attorney in the issuing (responding) state have a continuing duty to enforce the support order
or forward a copy of that order to courts in states capable of enforcing the order. Id. § 1682. The
Act also provides for criminal enforcement of support duties in a similar manner. Id. §§ 1660-
1661. See generally W. BROCKELBANK & F. INFAUSTO, INTERSTATE ENFORCEMENT OF FAMILY
SUPPORT (2d ed. 1971); COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, RECIPROCAL STATE LEGISLATION TO
ENFORCE SUPPORT OF DEPENDENTS (1964); Note, Domestic Relations: Interstate Enforcement of
Support Orders: Necessity and Feasibility of Federal Legislation, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 541 (1963).
68. 436 U.S. at 98.
69. Id. The Shaffer Court intentionally cast off the remnants of Pennoyer to the extent that
its reference to "acts in the forum" was interpreted by courts and commentators to require physi-
cal acts to support a state's exercise ofjudicial jurisdiction. 433 U.S. at 213. See Bethany Auto
Sales, Inc. v. Aptco Auto Auction, Inc., 564 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1977) (construing Shaffer to require
both a physical act in the forum and resulting injury); Pavlo v. James, 437 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) ("This court will not exercise jurisdiction under the New York long-arm statute upon mere
conclsory and indiscriminating allegations of New York transactions by a defendant, especially
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Rigorously consistent with a continually developing body of case law,
Kulko represents the Court's first application of Shaffer's unified juris-
dictional test to an in personam action. Although in future cases the
Court will certainly balance the particular facts in issue, its warning in
Hanson is apposite: "[I]t is a mistake to assume that this trend toward
enlarging in personam jurisdiction heralds the eventual demise of all
restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts."70
in light of the new caution currently being portrayed in measuring the constitutionality of asser-
tions of extraterritorial jurisdiction in general."); Dennett v. First Continental Inv. Corp., 559
S.W.2d 384 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977) (interpreting Shaffer as requiring defendant to have purposefully
done some act or consummated some transaction in the forum). See generally Note, supra note
50.
70. 357 U.S. at 251. See Boyer v. Boyer, - 11. --, 383 N.E.2d 223 (1978). In Bayer, plaintiff
alleged that the nonresident defendant owed arrearages in child support and alimony and that
failure to pay such arrearages constituted a "tortious act" sufficient to justify Illinois' assertion of
in personam jurisdiction over the defendant under the Illinois jurisdictional statute. ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch.1 10, § 17 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978) (conferring jurisdiction upon Illinois courts over de-
fendants who, inter alia, commit tortious acts within Illinois). Relying on Poindexter v. Willis, 87
Ill. App. 2d 213, 231 N.E.2d 1 (1967) (upholding jurisdiction in a case involving a nonresident
defendant's failure to support his illegitimate child, fathered in Illinois, and an Illinois resident),
the lower court upheld jurisdiction. Boyer v. Boyer, 57 Ill. App. 3d 555, 373 N.E.2d 441 (1978).
The Illinois Supreme Court noted that although language in Poindexter would support jurisdic-
tion upon the Bayer facts, Poindexter involved more substantial contacts between the defendant
and the forum. - Ill. at -, 383 N.E.2d at 225. Moreover, the court asserted that, in light of
Kulko, jurisdiction was lacking even if nonpayment of support by a nonresident was a tortious act
in Illinois. "[Tihe quality and nature of the defendant's activities in Illinois were not such that it
would be reasonable and fair to require him to conduct his defense here." Id. at -, 383 N.E.2d at
226. Again relying on Kulko, the court noted the availability of a URESA proceeding as one of
the factors justifying its holding. Id. at -, 383 N.E.2d at 227; see note 67 supra and accompany-
ing text.
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